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Abstract 
Theoretically, producer behavior models postulate that firms have had different objectives 
ranging from profit maximization to setting aspirational levels. The assumption of objective of 
profit maximization was shaped on the basis of the rationality principles which has lost 
relevance with the coming of the principle of behavioral economic in recent time. The present 
paper intends to throw some light on changes that have been made in the objective of firms over 
years and attempts to review some models emphasizing managerial utility as the core objective 
of firms. 
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Literature in microeconomics has a treasure of descriptions regarding the dominant objectives 
that the firms have had to pursue. At the beginning it was thought that the firms had been 
pursuing and had been expected to pursue only one objective that is the maximization of profit. 
This assumption of objective of profit maximization was shaped on the basis of the rationality 
principles. Based on rationality, it was supposed that economic agents, being rational, have had 
to pursue either the goal of utility satisfaction (for consumers) and profit maximization (for 
producers). Following this, in early times, producer behavioral theories and models in economics 
emphasized profit maximization as the sole objective of firms. Since then many shifts have been 
made in the considerations of the objectives of firms thanks mainly to the changes in the 
organization of firms. The objectives of sales maximization, revenue maximization and the 
managerial satisfaction (popularly known as the managerial utility function) are some of such 
changes or shifts in the objective of the firms. Among these, the most recent and the important 
one is the principle of managerial utility function which postulates that firms attempt to increase 
the managerial satisfaction as a proxy for many of its other important functions including the 
objective profit maximization. The tendency of offering high compensation packages for 
managers by the corporates stand testimony to the increasing attention on the part of the firms to 
focus much on the managers in an attempt to materialize the corporate objectives. The present 
paper intends to throw some light on changes that have been made in the objective of firms over 
years and attempts to review some models emphasizing managerial utility as the core objective 
of firms. 
Profit Maximization-the early sole objective of firms 
Profit maximization has been hypothesized as the rational behavior of a firm. Every firm 
attempts to maximize the profit given the cost and market conditions. The marginalist school in 
economics gave sufficient theoretical underpinnings to the objective of profit maximization. 
Economic theory uses two methods to explain the conditionality for the maximization of profit: 
One is the famous and direct Total Cost-Total Revenue Concept and the other is the Marginal 
Cost and Marginal Revenue method. Thanks to the popularity that the marginalism has assumed 
in the field of economics, it quite natural that the latter method has received wide currency in the 
realm of economic literature. The elucidation of the firms’ behavior in different market models 
like perfect completion and monopoly centers around the argument that the firms continue to 
produce at that point where the profit gets maximized, the so called equilibrium point. All firms 
irrespective of market conditions are supposed to behave rationally, and therefore, each one of 
them would be endeavoring to attain maximum profit. Although this could be considered as a 
starting point of the behavior of firms, this could not be regarded as the single objective with 
which all firms are expected to have been working.  
The main lacuna of this argument is that it does not take into account the effect of time more 
specifically the time value of money. Some firms under the real market conditions may act in 
such a way that they give up profits to withstand in the market, hoping that in the long run they 
would be able to reap the profit. The infamous strategy of selling products at a price less than the 
average cost by firms in an attempt to capture the market goes diametrically opposite to the profit 
maximization strategy of the firms. In the short turn firms are seemed to be giving up their profit 
for a high profit in the long run. This time element in the profit expectation of firms does not find 
any place in the profit maximization principle based on the rational economic behavior as 
postulated by the so called marginalist school in economics. Another point of weakness of this 
argument lies in the absolute negligence that it shows towards the uncertainty and risks involved 
in planning the activities of firms. Nevertheless, firms in the case of which ownership and 
control rest in the same hand, profit maximization may continue to be the sole objective, and it is 
not surprising that in small firms and business even today, profit is the sole objective. Some 
economists opine that the objective of profit maximization is just an assumption ( Mert, 2018) 
Shareholders and Managers 
The organizational changes in the structure of companies made a clear cut divide between the 
managers and the shareholders or the exact owners of the firms. The corporatization of business 
entities actually fuelled this trend, and triggered the difference between the objectives of 
managers and the shareholders. While in the earlier system of owners acting themselves as the 
managers, the objective of profit maximization had an important place. Bu in later times, with 
the coming up market capitalization of business entities, the objective of the ultimate owners or 
the shareholders of the company became different from that of the mangers. Although the 
shareholders wanted to have reasonably maximum profit from the business, the managers paid 
much attention to enhancing their own salaries, perks and other career opportunities. 
Shareholders did not have much information about the business and therefore, they could not 
exercise unlimited influence on the managers to pursue them to fall in line with the objective of 
maximizing profits. 
Sales Maximization, not profit maximization  
Managers appear to be more concerned with increasing the sales of the company in an attempt to 
keep the company as a market leader. The prestige of the manager does not depend on 
maximizing the profit but on the size of the market and the volume of business that they 
command. Taking this into account Prof.Baumol, opined that firms’ main objective is not to raise 
the level of profit, but to raise the sales of the company, after having attained a certain desirable 
limit of profit. In the view of Baumol, after an acceptable level of profit is reached, the emphasis 
of the firm will be shifted from profit maximization to sales maximization. Baumol argues that 
given the separation of ownership from management and changing organizational structure of 
firms, the shift to the objective of sales maximization has been quite evident. Since managers’ 
salaries and slacks (slacks are what managers receive over and above what is required to 
maintain them in the company. It is similar to ‘economic rent’ in traditional theory 
(Koutsoyiannis, 1979))  are more aligned with the volume of sales, not with the profit of the 
firms, it quite natural that managers would be focusing more on sales maximization rather than 
the profit maximization ( Baumol, 1959).  
Satisficing Behavior of firms 
In firms with dichotomization of the ownership and control of the entity, profit satisficing has 
been considered to be an important objective. Here, managers of the firms are expected to make 
a profit from business which would make shareholders or the owners of firms happy, and after 
making that satisficing profit, other objective that meet the aspirations of the mangers would be 
followed. The difference between the production behavior of a firm aiming for profit 
maximization and profit satisficing can be understood from the following figure where X axis 
measures the quantity of output and Y axis profits. Two levels profit are shown viz.’ πmax’, profit 
maximum level and ‘π’, the satisficing profit. It is evident that a profit maximizing firm would 
choose to produce ‘qp’ quantity of output while a profit satisficing might choose to produce any 
quantity between ‘qo’ and ‘qs’ (https://www.economicsdiscussion.net/firm, 2021).  The principle-
agent problem would occur in these cases. Managers being the agents possess all information 
about the firms, and therefore, they attempt to capitalize on the information asymmetry and try to 
pursue their own personal goals instead of focusing on enhancing the level of profit after a 
certain limit.  
Figure 1 Alternative Objectives of Firms: Profit Satisficing Behavior of Firms 
 
Source:    https://www.economicsdiscussion.net/firm 
Marris’s Managerial Utility Function 
In Marris’s model of Managerial Enterprise, Marris stresses the importance of managerial utility 
function in accomplishing the goal of a firm, the maximization of the balanced rate growth of the 
firm (Marris R. , 1963). In pursuing this goal, the firm has two main constraints: the availability 
managerial team and skill and a financial constraint (Marris R. , 1964). The utility function of the 
managers may be written as: 
 U M = f (salaries, power, status, job security) 
In the utility function of the managers, as outlined above, salaries occupy an important place 
along with other elements like power, status and job security. Putting it differently, the 
managerial utility function is nothing but a function of the compensation to managers plus some 
other quality variables like job security and status.  In pursuance of this, firms have been offering 
high salaries and job security to top level managers in an attempt to prompt promising managers 
to continue in the job and concentrate on furthering the designed objectives of firms including 
maximization of revenue, sales and profits.   
Williamson’s Model of Managerial Discretion 
It is well known that in the emerging business environment and the changing organizational 
structure of enterprises, managers enjoy certain discretionary powers in running the business not 
only in the interest of owners or shareholders but also, more importantly, in the interest of the 
managers themselves. These discretionary powers have been modeled first by O.Williamson in 
1963 (Williamson, 1963). It is argued that managers have full discretion in pursuing their own 
goals and not the owners’ objective of maximizing the profit. In fact, making or maximizing 
profit is regarded as something which acts as hindrance to the behavior of the managers. But, 
they need to take care of the profit in the absence of which their job security would be 
endangered. As in the Marris’s model here also the managerial utility function encompasses 
variables like salary, security, power, status, prestige, professional excellence and the like. It is 
obvious that of these variables only the first one can be made amenable to measurement. The 
others variable are together labeled as expense preference, ‘which is defined as the satisfaction 
which managers derive from certain types of expenditures’ (Koutsoyiannis, 1979).  
Concluding Observations 
Thus, it is quite evident that the tendency of offering high compensation packages for managers 
by the corporates stand testimony to the increasing attention on the part of the firms to focus 
much on the managers in an attempt to materialize the corporate objectives. This paper has 
thrown some light on changes that have been made in the objective of firms over years and 
attempts to review some models emphasizing managerial utility as the core objective of firms. 
As evident from the review of models, one can comprehend the importance attached to the 
maximization of managerial utility function in these days as the prominent of objective of firms.  
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